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Due Process in Administrative Hearings in
Pennsylvania: The Commingling of Functions Under
Feeser and Dussia
Gerald Gornish*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will examine the status of the law on due process in
administrative hearings in Pennsylvania. Several developments in
this area of the law have recently occurred. The Supreme Court of
the United States, which had earlier hinted that the combining in
one agency of both investigative and adjudicative functions might
be constitutionally impermissible,' has more recently stated that
this combination of functions does not, without more, create such a
risk of bias as to constitute a due process violation.' Recent Pennsyl-
vania decisions have mainly been concerned with the role of govern-
ment counsel, such as a deputy or an assistant of the Attorney
General' or a solicitor for a political subdivision.4 The problem of the
role of counsel is worthy of analysis and discussion for several rea-
sons. First, given the proliferation of administative agencies5 and
the increased right to due process hearings,' the need to assure that
* B.A., University of Pennsylvania (1958); LL.B., Harvard Law School (1961); Deputy
Attorney General and Director of Office of Civil Law of the Pennsylvania Department of
Justice. The views expressed herein are the author's alone. He recognizes that his position
and participation in many of the cases cited are bound to color his views, but believes he has
presented a fair view of the subject matter.
1. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, n.17 (1973).
2. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See text accompanying notes 73-82 infra.
3. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Feeser, 364 A.2d 1324 (Pa. 1976),
on remand, 371 A.2d 549 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977); Pennsylvania Dep't of Ins. v. American
Bankers Ins. Co., 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 189, 363 A.2d 874 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975); English v.
North East Bd. of Educ., 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 240, 348 A.2d 494 (1975); Donnon v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 18 Chester Co. 260 (Pa. C.P. 1970), reversed in part, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 283
A.2d 92 (1971).
5. For a listing of most of the state agencies, see Administrative Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, §§ 61-63, 101 to 180-6 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1977-1978). The creation of the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania as a court of initial jurisdiction over these agencies is a reflec-
tion of this proliferation. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 4; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.2 (Purdon
Supp. 1977-1978); DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION of 1967-68, at
836, 858, 865-70, 873, 889-92.
6. See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 97 S. Ct. 1723 (1977) (suspension of driver's license for re-
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counsel acts properly has become an increasingly important issue.
Second, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has viewed the
role of counsel issue as related to cases involving the commingling
of functions within an agency itself.7 Finally, the commonwealth
court asserts that the view of due process articulated by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania is at variance with the due process
standards expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States.8
This conclusion requires analysis since it is fundamental for predict-
ing the outcome of future due process cases in Pennsylvania related
to the way an administrative agency functions.
The difference in approach between the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the role of
counsel question is most clearly seen through an analysis of the case
of Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Feeser,' and this
peated convictions of traffic offenses does not require prior hearing); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972) (right to a hearing established by de facto tenure policy); Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (no right to a hearing unless liberty or property interest can be
shown); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (state must provide for due process hearing before
revocation of a driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (hearing required
before termination of welfare benefits); Manna v. City of Erie, 366 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1976)
(landlord entitled to hearing before escrowing of rent pursuant to rent withholding ordi-
nance); Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Rundle, 455 Pa. 8, 314 A.2d 842 (1974) (hearing
required before parole revocation). See also Amesbury v. Luzerne County Inst. Dist., 366 A.2d
631 (Pa. 1976) (nursing home employee not entitled to hearing before dismissal); Mahoney
v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 243, 320 A.2d 459 (1974) (housing author-
ity employees not entitled to hearing before discharge).
An appreciation for the increase in agency activity and judicial intervention within the past
ten years on the question of a right to a hearing may also be gained by a perusal of the cases
noted in Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated in those titles relating to state agencies,
such as title 40 (Insurance) and title 63 (Professional and Occupational Licensing).
7. The courts have decided cases involving the commingling of functions within an agency
itself, but no general principles or standards have emerged which may serve as a guide to
future agency action. In Mallon v. Township of Upper Moreland, 461 Pa. 241, 336 A.2d 266
(1975), affirming 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 618, 309 A.2d 273 (1973), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court split three-to-three in a case involving discipline of police officers by a township. In
Mallon, one of the commissioners lodged the complaint, then sat with the other commission-
ers to cast the deciding vote regarding discipline. The three Justices voting to affirm stressed
that the township commissioners imposed discipline in their executive capacity; the Justices
voting to reverse stated that due process is required even at that level. See Pennsylvania
Prevailing Wage Appeals Bd. v. Steve Black, Inc., 365 A.2d 685 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976). See
also Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1975); State Dental Council & Examining
Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 269-72, 318 A.2d 910, 914-15 (1974); Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa.
126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969); Schlesinger Appeal, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961). See generally
2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.02 (1958).
8. Compare English v. North East Bd. of Educ., 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 240, 348 A.2d 494
(1975), with Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See text accompanying notes 41-46 infra.
9. 364 A.2d 1324 (Pa. 1976).
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will be the initial focus of the article. Cases decided on the basis of
the commonwealth court's questionable holding in Feeser will then
be reviewed. Finally, the article will suggest an appropriate harmo-
nization of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania and the Supreme Court of the United States as a foundation
for further Pennsylvania court decisions in this area.
II. THE Feeser CASE
Feeser involved a complaint filed before the Pennylvania Human
Relations Commission (PHRC) relating to a refusal to sell a particu-
lar house to certain complainants because of their race. As required
under law,' 0 when the matter came before a panel of the Commis-
sion for hearing on the complaint, the case was presented by the
general counsel for the PHRC. As far as the record showed, counsel
simply presented the case before the Commission; he did not advise
the Commission in any way regarding its rulings or decision. How-
ever, he did ultimately prepare the adjudication for the Commission
after the Commission had reached its decision.
The respondents argued before the Commission that they were
denied due process of law because of the inherent conflict in having
counsel for the Commission present the case. The Commission de-
nied the objection. On appeal, the commonwealth court reversed
and held that there was a denial of due process." The common-
wealth court's opinion in Feeser was not helpful in ascertaining the
basis of its conclusions. On the question of whether it violates due
process when an attorney both represents the complainants before
the hearing board and acts as counsel for the full commission, the
court simply stated: "[W]e must sustain the position of appellants
based on the recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Horn v. Township of Hilitown . . . .In that case, the decision of
this court was reversed in a case less compelling than the instant
case."" After quoting a portion of the Horn opinion, 3 the common-
10. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon Supp. 1977-
1978).
11. 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 406, 341 A.2d 584 (1975).
12. Id. at 408, 341 A.2d at 586 (citation omitted). In Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461
Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975), the solicitor of a township represented the township before its
zoning board, served as the counsel for the board, conducted the hearing in the very case he
was presenting, and advised the zoning board on the legal matters in the case. The Pennsyl-
1977
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wealth court remanded for a new hearing.
Significantly, the commonwealth court nowhere referred to the
record to present the factual basis for the question of due process
which it posed and purported to answer. Therefore, it is uncertain
which of two possible factual patterns had been deemed violative
of due process: whether the violation was that (1) counsel advised
the panel and the Commission in this very case (which advice,
therefore, should have appeared on the record); or (2) counsel not
only represented complainants before the Commission in this case,
but also gave legal advice generally to the Commission in other
matters. If the court meant to disallow the first situation and there
was something in the record to support its-factual occurrence, then
clearly under Horn a new hearing was required. But if the second
circumstance was the foundation for the holding, the court was
going far beyond Horn.
On appeal in Feeser, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
the commonwealth court had misapplied Horn. After thoroughly
considering the record,'" the court held that it contained no evidence
to support the contention that PHRC's general counsel advised the
hearing panel at the hearing or in the decisional process.'" The court
further stated that there was nothing in the record which indicated
that the various determinations made by the hearing panel were
made because the general counsel had advised it so to rule; each
motion, according to the court, was denied by the panel in the
exercise of independent judgment after hearing both arguments.,
The supreme court therefore held that the limited, purely adversary
role of PHRC's general counsel was distinguishable from the con-
vania Supreme Court appropriately concluded that the appearance of a fair hearing was not
met because the attorney opposing the applicant was also in effect deciding the case.
13. The court's opinion stated:
In the case at bar, while we are not faced with a tribunal that has allegedly denied
due process to a litigant, we are presented with a governmental body charged with
certain decision-making functions that must avoid the appearance of possible preju-
dice, be it from its members or from those who advise it or represent parties before it.
In the instant case, the same solicitor represented both the zoning hearing board and
the township, which was opposing appellants' application for a zoning variance. While
no prejudice has been shown by this conflict of interest, it is our opinion that such a
procedure is susceptible to prejudice and, therefore, must be prohibited.
461 Pa. at 748, 337 A.2d at 860.
14. See 364 A.2d at 1327-30.
15. Id. at 1327.
16. Id. at 1330.
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duct condemned by the court in Horn.7
It is thus clear that a majority 8 of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, would allow an attorney for a state agency-or possibly a
political subdivision 9-to "prosecute" a case before that body even
though the attorney is the general counsel or solicitor for that body,
provided that the attorney gives no advice or makes no rulings in
the particular case. Although the court has not afforded us a full
analysis, and the holding is one which inherently is affected by
factual variations, it would nevertheless appear that the supreme
court has cast doubt on several of the rulings of the commonwealth
court made in reliance upon its opinion in Feeser.
Upon a review of those cases, however, it is seen that the common-
wealth court was strongly influenced by another decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Dussia v. Barger.0 Therefore, before
discussing the commonwealth court cases, a brief review of Dussia
is in order.
III. THE COMMONWEALTH COURT DECISIONS ON THE ROLE OF COUNSEL
A. The Dussia Case
In Dussia, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enjoined the court-
17. The supreme court observed:
It is clear that Horn describes a situation which is completely different from that
encountered in this case. In Horn the attorney involved was: (1) making objections to
the evidence offered by his opponent, and then ruling on his own objections; (2)
offering evidence to which his opponent objected and then ruling on the objection to
his proffered evidence; and (3) advising the hearing panel concerning the law during
the post-hearing process of deciding the merits of his opponent's case. In this case,
PHRC's general counsel argued the merits of motions made by his opponent and asked
that they be denied. So far as the record shows, and it is clear the counsel for the
Feesers would have objected had the record not accurately reflected what transpired
at the hearing, there was no consultation between PHRC's counsel and the hearing
panel. Each motion was decided by the panel on the basis of the arguments presented
by both counsel in open session.
Id. at 1331.
The case was remanded to the commonwealth court. On remand, the court affirmed the
decision of the Human Relations Commission in part, with modifications, and reversed in
part. 371 A.2d 549 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
18. The decision was four-to-three, Chief Justice Jones and Justices Eagen and Pomerory
dissenting without opinion.
19. There is currently before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that very issue on appeal
from the commonwealth court in Appeal of Feldman, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 451, 346 A.2d 895
(1975).
20. 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1975).
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martial of a high official in the State Police because the Commis-
sioner of the State Police performed both prosecutorial and adjudi-
cative functions. The court concluded that the Commissioner was
statutorily required to adjudicate a court-martial based on the rec-
ommendation of the board he appoints, but that his prosecutorial
function of convening a disciplinary board for court-martials was
imposed by regulation only. Accordingly, the regulation was invalid
and had to be changed to avoid due process infirmity. 2
Dussia's holding should be limited because of the unusual nature
of the court-martial procedure. Moreover, Dussia concerned an
employer-employee relationship in a military-like organization in
which the authority to both "prosecute" and "adjudicate" was re-
posed in one individual. Once the head of an agency such as the
State Police decides to convene a disciplinary board, it might seem
rather clear to his subordinates who are to sit on the board that the
head of the agency feels there is reason for disciplinary action
against the employee. Having made the decision to "prosecute," the
head of the agency more than likely will wish to "convict"; other-
wise he would have dropped the matter. The board he appoints to
hear the case and he, in adjudicating the case, will be so guided.
In the ordinary administrative agency case, complaints reach the
agency from various sources. The decision to "prosecute" does not
involve the personal relationships involved in a court-martial. It is
not the head of the agency whose interest is at stake, but the general
public interest. There is not an agency position or reputation which
is to be vindicated or preserved; the agency is merely a tribunal to
adjudicate the matter even though, technically, it may also be the
"prosecutor." Thus, the hearing posture of the agency is that of a
court, sworn to enforce and uphold the law, but not predisposed to
find the facts in favor of either side.
Another reason for limiting Dussia is that the supreme court
equated the court-martial to a quasi-criminal proceeding. The court
relied on the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal
Justice, which state that the decision to institute criminal proceed-
ings should be the responsibility of the prosecutor. 2 Whatever
21. Id. at 166, 351 A.2d at 674-75. In a petition for reargument, it was pointed out that
§§ 205(4) and 711(b)(1) of the Administrative Code of 1929, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 65 (e),
251(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978), appear to give the State Police Commissioner the prose-
cutorial function.
22. THE AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION
Vol. 15: 581
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applicability these standards may have to a court-martial, they are
not a precedent in the normal administrative agency case, which
clearly is not a criminal proceeding.
The precedent cited in Dussia also limits the scope of the holding.
The court cited Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath," a United States
Supreme Court decision that held that deportation proceedings had
to conform to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act,24 which did not permit cases to be decided by persons who
prosecute cases of a similar nature. The court's reliance would ap-
pear to be misplaced, because McGrath was a statutory decision,
not a constitutional holding. Although the Supreme Court in
McGrath stated that the commingling of the functions of investiga-
tion and advocacy are "plainly undesirable,"25 the Court said noth-
ing about their being unconstitutional. Moreover, the actual holding
of the case was rejected by Congress, which thereafter specifically
exempted the Immigration and Naturalization Service from the
separation of function requirements of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.H In a constitutional context, the Supreme Court of the
United States later held that the commingling of functions in a
deportation proceeding did not, in and of itself, violate due pro-
cess.
27
Dussia also cited In re Murchison,2 8 where the United States Su-
preme Court struck down a statute which allowed a judge to act as
a so-called "one man grand jury" by indicting a defendant, then
acting as the defendant's trial judge. In re Murchison's impact,
however, has been limited by the recent decision of Withrow v.
Larkin.2 In Withrow, the Supreme Court stated:
Plainly enough, Murchison has not been understood to stand
for the broad rule that the members of an administrative
agency may not investigate the facts, institute proceedings,
AND DEFENSE FUNCrION 3.4 (approved draft 1971) provides: "(a) The decision to institute
criminal proceedings should be initially and primarily the responsibility of the prosecutor."
23. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
24. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970).
25. 339 U.S. at 44, quoting REPORT OF THE ATroRNE GENERAL'S COMMITrEE ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1941).
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970).
27. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
28. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
29. 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See text accompanying notes 72-83 infra.
1977
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and then make the necessary adjudications. The court did not
purport to question the Cement Institute case . . . or the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and did not lay down any general
principle that a judge before whom an alleged contempt is
committed may not bring and preside over the ensuing con-
tempt proceedings. The accepted rule is to the contrary."0
Finally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited two Pennsylvania
cases, Schlesinger Appeal,3 and Gardner v. Repasky,3 which con-
demned the commingling of prosecutorial and judicial functions.
But in State Dental Council & Examining Board v. Pollock,33 the
court had discussed those very cases and held that so long as the
functions are separated, due process is served:
A fortiori, there is no Due Process violation in the administra-
tive structure employed here, where both functions were han-
dled by distinct administrative entities with no direct affilia-
tion to one another. The cases cited by appellant such as
Schlesinger, supra; Gardner, supra; and Murchison, supra,
where the same individuals actually participated in both prose-
cutory and judicial roles are clearly distinguishable.34
The above analysis indicates that Dussia should be limited to
situations where one individual is both prosecutor and adjudicator.
This conclusion is supported by Justice Nix' application of those
cases in Dussia which he distinguished in Pollock, and his observa-
tion that while the State Police Commissioner did not assume the
entire prosecutorial role, the decision to institute the prosecution
was solely his.3" Thus, it would seem appropriate to limit Dussia to
the kind of fact situation present in Murchison, Schlesinger, and
Gardner, where the prosecutorial and judicial roles were combined.
Significantly, as of the date of this writing, the supreme court has
not cited Dussia-even in its opinion in the Feeser case.
The application of Dussia to cases involving the role of counsel,
as opposed to the role of the ultimate adjudicator, is questionable.
30. 421 U.S. at 53-54.
31. 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961).
32. 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969).
33. 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910 (1974).
34. Id. at 271-72, 318 A.2d at 915.
35. 466 Pa. at 164-65, 351 A.2d at 673-74.
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Even where counsel properly participates in advising an agency
regarding an adjudication, only counsel's legal advice is binding, not
his or her recommendations regarding factual findings. Thus coun-
sel is never the ultimate adjudicator. 30 Nevertheless, in English v.
North East Board of Education,3 7 the commonwealth court applied
Dussia, in conjunction with Horn, 38 in an effort to show that Penn-
sylvania standards of due process as enunciated in those cases go
far beyond those required by the Federal Constitution.
In English, a teacher was dismissed for unsatisfactory work after
a hearing before the school board. Upon appeal, the common pleas
court reversed the board on the basis that its adjudication was not
supported by substantial evidence. The commonwealth court re-
jected this conclusion 31 and found the hearing violative of due pro-
cess because the school board's solicitor had presided at the hearing,
made evidentiary rulings, and acted as prosecutor. 0 By comparing
Withrow v. Larkin4 with Dussia (which was decided six months
after Withrow and did not even cite that case), the commonwealth
court became convinced that "our State Supreme Court, presuma-
bly as a matter of state law, is applying a more stringent standard
to prevent a commingling of the judicial and prosecutorial functions
than the United States Supreme Court is presently applying. 942
Thus, it determined that Horn was decided by the supreme court
under state constitutional grounds.
This view of the Horn decision is questionable and is not man-
dated by Dussia or Feeser; neither case holds specifically that Horn
was decided on state grounds. And, by negative implication, the
lack of such a specific holding in Feeser may be regarded as an
indication that the supreme court does not agree with the common-
wealth court. 43 Nor does the Horn case, the progenitor of Feeser,
36. But see Donnon v. Downingtown Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 283 A.2d
92 (1971). See text accompanying notes 65-69 infra.
37. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 240, 348 A.2d 494 (1975).
38. See notes 12 & 13 supra.
39. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 242, 348 A.2d at 495.
40. Id. at 244, 348 A.2d at 496.
41. 421 U.S. 35 (1975). Interestingly enough, the commonwealth court had previously
relied on Withrow to reject due process challenges in Rayne v. Edgewood School Dist., 19 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 353, 339 A.2d 151 (1975) (school district) and Barr v. Pine Township Bd. of
Supervisors, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 255, 341 A.2d 581 (1975) (township supervisors).
42. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 244, 348 A.2d at 496.
43. The Dussia case and the commonwealth court's view of its holding were raised in the
briefs before the supreme court in Feeser.
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indicate a more stringent view of due process standards in Pennsyl-
vania. The many roles assumed by the attorney in Horn" make that
case analogous to the Murchison case,45 on which it in part relied,"
a case decided under federal standards. It seems, therefore, that
Dussia should be regarded as unique because of the peculiar nature
of court-martial procedures and the reposing of the prosecutorial
and adjudicative roles in one person in a quasi-criminal proceeding.
Dussia does not appear to be a signal that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania is going beyond the standards of the United States
Constitution.
B. Other Commonwealth Court Cases
The commonwealth court has considered several cases involving
the role of counsel where a dismissed school employee seeks review
before the school board. In In re Feldman,47 a school district solicitor
tried the case in support of dismissal, after which he either prepared
or assisted in the preparation of the school board's adjudication. 8
The president of the school board had announced at the outset of
the hearing that the board would not be represented by counsel and
that the solicitor would simply serve to present the case. The com-
monwealth court, nevertheless, following its opinion in Feeser, held
that there was an appearance of possible prejudice, and remanded
for a new hearing. 9 In view of the supreme court's decision in Feeser,
this decision is questionable."
Feldman should be contrasted with English v. North East Board
of Education,5 where the commonwealth court was again faced with
a dismissed school employee. In English, the solicitor apparently
44. See note 13 supra.
45. See text accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra. Furthermore, the facts in Dussia are
similar to those in In re Murchison.
46. See 461 Pa. at 748, 337 A.2d at 860.
47. 2. Pa. Commw. Ct. 451, 346 A.2d 895 (1975).
48. The preparation of an adjudication by counsel who prosecuted a case before an admin-
istrative agency after the agency has reached its decision was specifically upheld in State
Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 270-73, 318 A.2d 910, 914-15 (1974).
Accord, Commonwealth v. Chairman, 377 A.2d 1022 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
49. 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 452-53, 346 A.2d at 896.
50. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted allocatur in Feldman and, since the
author has submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the Attorney General on the side of the
school board, it would be inappropriate to comment further on this case.
51. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 240, 348 A.2d 494 (1975). See text accompanying notes 37-42
supra.
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acted in the dual role of judge and prosecutor; he presided at the
hearing, made several evidentiary rulings, and, at the same time,
presented the testimony to show the unsatisfactory ratings of the
teacher. In this case, the commonwealth court held, quite properly,
that there was a denial of due process. While its reliance on Feeser
to reach this holding was misplaced, the case would certainly fall
under Horn in view of the solicitor's activities, which went far be-
yond that which took place in either Feeser or Feldman.
In State Board of Medical Education & Licensure v. Grumbles,52
the commonwealth court communicated the breadth of its holding
in Feeser. In Grumbles, an attorney assigned to a state agency had
"prosecuted" the case before the board. After the board decided the
case, a different attorney who worked in the Department of Jus-
tice-but not in the particular state agency in question-drafted the
adjudication for the Board. The court stated: "If this dual role of
the Board's counsel is not a violation of due process, it comes peril-
ously close to being so."" Yet in State Dental Council & Examining
Board v. Pollock,54 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had specifi-
cally sanctioned the drafting of an adjudication to embody the
Board's decision by the attorney who had "prosecuted" the case. If
the conduct in Pollock was not a violation of due process, a fortiori,
the drafting of the adjudication by an attorney from another agency
should not be a violation. Indeed, the action in Grumbles conformed
with the suggestion of the supreme court in Pollock that it is better
to have the adjudication prepared by an attorney in another
agency.5
In Grumbles, the commonwealth court also conveyed by way of
dicta its belief that the hearing was possibly invalid under Dussia.
The dicta suggests that even where different attorneys from differ-
ent agencies carry out the distinct prosecutorial and advisory func-
tions, due process is denied. The only basis for such a conclusion
52. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 74, 347 A.2d 782 (1975).
53. Id. at 79, 347 A.2d at 785.
54. See note 48 supra.
55. The court concluded that
[wihile it would be a better practice to have review of adjudications conducted by an
individual who did not participate in the prosecutorial role, we can find no prejudice
here where the Board reached its decision independent of and prior to any assistance
from the representative of the Department of Justice.
457 Pa. at 272-73, 318 A.2d at 915.
56. The court stated:
1977
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is that both attorneys are under the control of the Attorney General.
Such a conclusion would completely stymie the operation of state
government because all attorneys are appointed by the Attorney
General,57 who has the duty both to advise and represent the various
state agencies. 58 If the only way to avoid this alleged conflict would
be to obtain outside counsel to handle one of the roles, a most
unsatisfactory resolution of this problem would be reached. 9
In Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Thorp, Reed &
Armstrong" and Pennsylvania Department of Insurance v. Ameri-
can Bankers Insurance Co.,"' the commonwealth court again con-
fronted the problem of the role of counsel. In the former case, the
court was faced with a change of procedure by the PHRC from that
which had been scrutinized in Feeser. In Thorp, one PHRC attorney
presented the charges while another attorney, PHRC's general
counsel, served as the legal advisor to the PHRC. After examining
the previously discussed cases, the court noted that it was not deal-
ing with the constitutionally impermissible circumstances where
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions are commingled in the
same individual.2 The court then stated: "Instead, we have two
individuals who are both within the same branch of an administra-
tive entity, one handling a prosecutorial function and the other
We feel compelled to allude to what may be an additional infirmity in the proceedings.
It is clear that the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure, as under the
statute it was required to do, acted in both a prosecutorial and adjudicative capacity.
In the recent case of Dussia v. Barger ..., our Supreme Court struck down regulations
of the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police providing for a Disciplinary
Board appointed by the Commissioner to investigate complaints against members and
to make recommendations to the Commissioner as to whether he should convene a
court martial, whose recommendations would in turn be reviewed and accepted or
disapproved by the Commissioner.
22 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 79, 347 A.2d at 785.
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 192, 296 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
58. Id. §§ 192, 292-93 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1977-1978).
59. See text accompanying notes 90-92 infra. Such a resolution would also appear to
conflict with the court's holding in City of Philadelphia v. Hays, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 621,
320 A.2d 406 (1974). In Hays, the court held that the appointment by the city solicitor of
counsel to the Police Department and the Civil Service Commission did not thereby prevent
policemen from receiving due process in hearings before the Commission.
60. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 295, 361 A.2d 497 (1976). The role of counsel issue arose in Thorp
when a female associate of a Pittsburgh law firm filed a complaint with the PHRC alleging
discrimination in employment because of age and sex.
61. 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 189, 363 A.2d 874 (1976). In American Bankers, the state Insur-
ance Commissioner found an insurance company in violation of certain insurance regulations.
62. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 302, 361 A.2d at 501.
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separately handling an adjudicatory function. These circumstances
place us at the interface between a constitutionally permissible and
a constitutionally impermissible commingling of prosecutorial and
adjudicatory functions." 3
In American Bankers, the interface was crossed. In this case, the
state agency also used two attorneys; one prosecuted the case, and
one sat as a hearing examiner for the agency head. The attorney
acting as a hearing examiner was associate chief counsel of the
department. Because the counsel who prosecuted the case was the
direct subordinate of the hearing examiner, the court held that the
line separating constitutionally permissible conduct from impermis-
sible action had been crossed. 4 The court so concluded even though
in Thorp, where general counsel had advised the hearing panel, the
fact situation was practically the same. The only distinguishing
factor in this case was that the superior was acting as a hearing
examiner rather than as a legal advisor. This distinction should
have made no substantial difference; the role of a hearing examiner
is to make legal determinations during the course of a hearing and
to submit a recommended decision to the head of an agency. An
attorney advising a hearing panel carries out basically the same
function, except that he does not determine facts, but merely ad-
vises the hearing panel on the application of the law.
Two further decisions of the commonwealth court should be men-
tioned, one involving a borough and the other, a school district. In
Donnon v. Downingtown Civil Service Commission,"5 a case that
predated both Feeser and Horn, a borough solicitor advised the civil
service commission regarding charges preferred by the borough
against a borough police officer. Although the borough retained out-
side counsel to represent it, the solicitor had previously assisted in
preparing the charges against the officer." The solicitor had pre-
63. Id. Thorp was cited with approval and followed in Boehm v. Board of Educ., 373 A.2d
1372 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (assistant solicitor prosecuted and board solicitor advised board
in professional employee dismissal hearing).
64. 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 192, 363 A.2d at 876. The decision was four-to-one, with
President Judge Bowman dissenting. A petition for allowance of appeal was granted by the
supreme court and argument is scheduled for the October, 1977 term of the court.
65. 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 283 A.2d 92 (1971), affirming in part 18 Chester Co. 260 (Pa.
C.P. 1970).
66. 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 370, 283 A.2d at 94; 18 Chester Co. at 262. The lower court
questioned why the borough had assigned its own counsel to represent the Commission and
suggested that had outside counsel been retained to represent the commission and had the
solicitor been allowed to represent the borough, due process would have been afforded. The
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sided over the hearing, made legal rulings, and advised the commis-
sion. The commonwealth court held that the procedural rights of the
officer to a fair and unbiased hearing had been violated by allowing
the solicitor to exercise control over both the prosecutory and adju-
dicatory operations." Donnon is not as extreme a factual situation
as Horn since there were two attorneys in Donnon, each carrying out
a different function. But if the solicitor had first helped the borough
prefer charges and then had advised the commission, the Horn ra-
tionale could have been applied, especially if factual rather than
legal issues had been predominant. 8
Both courts acknowledged in Donnon the financial burden which
political subdivisions would incur retaining outside counsel in such
cases. In fact, Judge Kurtz of the common pleas court apparently
foresaw the Horn ruling by suggesting the retention of outside coun-
sel for agencies such as zoning boards whenever a municipality is a
party or has an interest in the outcome. 9 Of course, if such boards
have sufficient legal expertise, it might be possible to have no coun-
sel appointed for them, as in the Feeser or Feldman cases. One
might question how Donnon and Feldman can stand together. If in
Feldman counsel for a political subdivision merely did what the
court in Donnon said he should do-prosecute-and not offer ad-
vice, what difference does it make that there was no counsel to
advise the board?
In Department of Education v. Oxford Area School District, 70 the
commonwealth court sustained a decision of the Secretary of
Education which held that due process was denied where a super-
intendent of a school district testified against a teacher before the
commonwealth court agreed: "We believe that the Borough should have assigned indepen-
dent Commission counsel thus allowing the solicitor to proceed unfettered to pursue the civil
prosecution on the basis of his investigation and complaint." 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 370, 283
A.2d at 94. The fact that the borough retained outside counsel was not set forth in the opinion
of the lower court. Id. at 367, 283 A.2d at 93.
67. 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 370-71, 283 A.2d at 94. Whereas the lower court had simply
reversed the dismissal, 18 Chester Co. at 262, the commonwealth court held that a new
hearing should be held. 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 367, 283 A.2d at 93.
68. Subsequent cases of the court have stressed the coalescing of the prosecutory and
adjudicatory function in one individual as the rationale of Donnon. This perspective overlooks
the retention of outside counsel, but makes the holding of Donnon consistent with Horn. See
City of Philadelphia v. Hays, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 621, 629, 320 A.2d 406, 411 (1974); Was-
niewski v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 166, 170-71, 299 A.2d 676, 678 (1973);
Ironstone Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 420, 423, 291 A.2d 310, 312 (1972).
69. See 18 Chester Co. at 260.
70. 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 421, 356 A.2d 857 (1976).
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school board in a dismissal case, and then assisted the board in
reaching its decision by answering questions of the board at a pri-
vate session. In Oxford, the court did not cite Feeser. It relied in-
stead on Horn and Donnon. The court emphasized that the superin-
tendent's role as an adverse witness was crucial in the case. The fact
that he had initially investigated the incident which gave rise to the
dismissal and had recommended a hearing was not, in the view of
the court, sufficient to indicate any bias that would render his par-
ticipation in the adjudicatory phase constitutionally objectiona-
ble.7
Similarly, the relationship between counsel should not be a deter-
mining factor so long as the two lawyers' functions are separated in
a particular case. If the functions are separated, it should be imma-
terial that an assistant chief counsel carries out one function and his
subordinate the other, as in American Bankers, or even that one of
the attorneys is chief counsel, as in Thorp. Where a subordinate
attorney investigates a case and prosecutes, the fact that he or she
is generally subject to review by the attorney who advises the agency
in the particular case does not deny due process where the superior
has not participated in the investigation and prosecution of the
particular case.
III. HARMONIZING CASES FOR FUTURE REFERENCE
A. Withrow v. Larkin
It is apparent from the foregoing analyses that no dogma inherent
in the holdings of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or compelling
logic in the decisions of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
require the supreme court to reject the standards enunciated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Withrow v. Larkin.72
Withrow sets forth flexible and realistic standards of due process
which give due weight to the practicalities faced by various adminis-
trative agencies, yet meet the dictates of fairness which the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has sought to assert in Horn and Dussia.73
In Withrow, a licensing board held an investigative hearing to
determine whether a doctor had engaged in proscribed acts. Based
on the evidence presented at that hearing, the board would decide
71. Id. at 426-27, 356 A.2d at 861.
72. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
73. See The Supreme Court, 1974, 89 HARv. L. REv. 47, 76-77 (1975).
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whether to warn or reprimand the doctor, institute actions to revoke
his license, or dismiss the case. The investigative hearing was held
and the board decided to hold a formal hearing to determine
whether the physician's license should be suspended. In response,
the doctor brought an action against the board for injunctive relief
and a temporary restraining order. The doctor charged that he
would be denied due process by such a formal hearing since the
same board had already investigated the charges against him. A
three-judge court agreed and enjoined the holding of a hearing."
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that there was
no denial of due process and that the board could proceed with its
formal hearing.
The Court held that the combination of investigative and adjudi-
cative functions does not, by itself, overcome the presumption of
integrity in public officials, nor does it create such a psychological
risk of prejudgment that there is an unconstitutional risk of bias.75
Merely because a board receives facts prior to a hearing does not
prevent it, legally or practically, from rendering a fair decision after
a hearing at which the facts are actually introduced." The Supreme
Court noted that the great variety of administrative agencies and
their complex tasks make it impossible to lay down one hard and
fast rule. 7
Recognizing that a particular fact situation might foreclose an
agency from a fair and effective consideration at the adversary hear-
ing,78 the Court looked carefully at how the board had operated in
the particular case.79 The initial decision to investigate was simply
a preliminary step. Thereafter, in determining that a formal hearing
should be held, the board had anticipated an adjudication would
result; but there was no reason to believe that the adjudication
would necessarily be against the doctor. 0 The fact that the board
had investigated and decided to hold a hearing did not mean that
74. 368 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
75. 421 U.S. at 47-52.
76. Id. at 54-57.
77. "The incredible variety of administrative mechanisms in this country will not yield
to any single organizing principle." Id. at 52.
78. Id. at 58.
79. Id. at 54-55.
80. The Court stated: "[Tihere was no more evidence of bias or the risk of bias or
prejudgment than inhered in the very fact that the Board had investigated and would now
adjudicate." Id. at 54.
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it could not fairly adjudicate on the basis of the evidence to be
presented. The mere exposure to investigative evidence is insuffi-
cient to impugn the fairness of board members at a later adversary
hearing.8 Additionally, the Supreme Court held that even though
the board had turned over formal findings to the District Attorney
and had suggested both criminal action and action to revoke the
doctor's license, the board was still capable of judging the case
fairly.2
The Supreme Court's analysis in Withrow responds to many of
the concerns raised by the commonwealth court concerning the
commingling of functions by agencies and their counsel. 3 A broad-
based limitation on the right of counsel to function-as announced
by the commonwealth court but rejected by the Supreme Court in
Feeser-is not mandated by Withrow. Accordingly, there is no in-
consistency between Withrow and the holdings of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.
Our inquiry can not now end, however; we must go on to examine
the appropriateness of the standard enunciated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Horn which the commonwealth court attempted
to apply in Feeser. Our focus will be on the question whether Horn
supports a desirable constitutional goal even if it seems to have led
the commonwealth court astray. Upon the obvious affirmative re-
81. The Court concluded:
The risk of bias or prejudgment in this sequence of functions has not been considered
to be intolerably high or to raise a sufficiently great possibility that the adjudicators
would be so psychologically wedded to their complaints that they would consciously
or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed position. Indeed, just
as there is no logical inconsistency between a finding of probable cause and an acquit-
tal in a criminal proceeding, there is no incompatibility between the agency filing a
complaint based on probable cause and a subsequent decision, when all the evidence
is in, that there has been no violation of the statute.
The initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication
have different bases and purposes. The fact that the same agency makes them in
tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not result in a procedural due
process violation.
Id. at 57-58.
82. Id. at 55-57, 58-59 n.26.
83. In Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Assoc., 426 U.S. 482
(1976), the Court applied its teachings in Withrow to a school board hearing. The board,
which was negotiating a teachers' collective bargaining contract, conducted disciplinary hear-
ings after the teachers illegally went on strike, then terminated the teachers' employment.
In a six-to-three vote, the Court held that the facts obtained by the board did not disqualify
it as a decision-maker or remove its objectivity.
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sponse, we must inquire why the commonwealth court had difficulty
in applying that standard in Feeser.
B. The Appropriateness of the Horn Standard
Horn held that, in finding a due process violation, neither actual
prejudice nor harm is necessary; it is the "appearance of possible
prejudice" which is the key. 4 In Horn, the court found no actual
prejudice, but the procedure, involving various roles by counsel, was
"susceptible to prejudice."8 The broad proscription to avoid even
the "appearance of prejudice" does not really help counsel for a
state agency or political subdivision to determine what is and what
is not proper. Neither was it helpful to the commonwealth court
when in Feeser it determined that it "appeared" prejudicial to allow
the general counsel to an agency, whose usual role is to advise and
represent the agency, to represent a complainant before the agency.
It is thus necessary to look more closely at the role of government
counsel in order to be able to define more exactly which
"appearances" are legally permissible and which are not. 8
Under state law, the Department of Justice has the power and
duty "to supervise, direct and control all of the legal business"87 of
substantially the entire executive branch of state government. In-
cluded in these functions are representation in litigation and the
rendering of binding legal advice. 8 These two duties to advise and
to represent are, on occasion, antithetical. For example, in hearings
before state agencies, a Commonwealth attorney normally presents
a case to the agency and the agency requires legal advice as to its
responsibilities. Even before Horn, the Department of Justice took
the position that the same attorney could not perform both of these
duties at the same time.8
84. See note 13 supra.
85. 461 Pa. at .748, 337 A.2d at 860.
86. Because of a plethora of statutes involving political subdivisions and the functions of
their counsel, the following discussion will be limited to the functions of the Attorney General
of Pennsylvania and attorneys under his jurisdiction.
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 292(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
88. Id. §§ 192, 292(a), 293 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1977-1978).
89. No formal directive was issued, but the chief counsels of the state agencies were so
advised orally, as were the attorneys who prosecuted cases before the agencies. This separa-
tion of functions is reflected in State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa.
264, 318 A.2d 910 (1974), and State Board of Medical Educ. & Licensure v. Grumbles, 22 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 74, 347 A.2d 782 (1975). The variations in size of the legal staffs in the agencies
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Because of the way the "legal office" of the Commonwealth is
organized, it is generally impossible to separate attorneys by the
functions they perform into "representation" attorneys and
"advice" attorneys. The Attorney General appoints to each Com-
monwealth agency a cadre of attorneys who are under the direction
and supervision of various divisions of the Office of Civil Law of the
Pennsylvania Department of Justice." The size of the legal offices
of each of these agencies varies and ranges from one attorney to.
over sixty, depending on the amount of legal work required by the
agency. The attorneys for the agencies carry on the daily legal
affairs of those agencies, including the rendering of legal advice,
agency representation, and the handling of administrative hearings
before the agencies.
Many of the agencies are required to conduct hearings regarding
such matters as license and permit approvals, rate approvals, and
compliance by regulated parties with state law. Often these cases
arise as a result of an agency investigation, a third-party complaint,
or both. The attorneys who "prosecute" these cases before the state
agency normally have other legal duties in addition to their prosecu-
torial duties. To preclude them from prosecuting because they also
render legal advice to the agency would lead to undesirable and
impractical alternatives, detrimental to the ability of the Common-
wealth to carry on its responsibilities under state regulatory law. An
alternative would be to require attorneys to do nothing but prose-
cute; but this would be totally impractical in a small agency or one
which does not have many hearings, and might deprive the Com-
monwealth of the expertise of its best attorneys who would normally
advise and represent state agencies. A similar problem would arise
from appointing attorneys from other agencies to "prosecute." Not
only would this deny the Commonwealth the acquired expertise of
an attorney in a particular area, it would also disrupt the legal
departments of the other state agencies. A final alternative would
be to bring in outside attorneys. This would not only be expensive,
it would also frustrate the ability of an agency to have a policy
presented by those most expert in the field. Moreover, it would
make completely separate and internalized functions, as required for federal agencies by the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1970), and as endorsed by 2 K. DAvis, ADMINIs-
ThTIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.11 (1958), virtually impossible.
90. See 4 PA. CODE § 9.31 at 43.33 for the structure of these offices. The charts of other
state agencies show their liaison with the Department of Justice. Id. at 43.24-.52.
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constitute an abrogation of the Department of Justice's functions
under the Administrative Code." This was, however, the solution
proposed by the commonwealth court in Donnon v. Downingtown
Civil Service Commission," where the court required that outside
counsel be used as the advisor rather than the prosecutor, at least
where the agency's counsel has participated in the plans to prose-
cute.
As suggested earlier, Donnon is an appropriate decision on its
facts, but should not be read either always to require an attorney
to advise the agency or to mandate that the agency be advised by
"outside" counsel." The Thorp" decision is an indication that the
court agrees with this conclusion. The Department of Justice should
have the flexibility to make such arrangements as may be practical
and necessary to prevent an improper commingling. In those agen-
cies with sufficient legal personnel, this may be accomplished by the
use of different counsel within the agency to function in the distinct
roles. In those instances where, because of the small size of the legal
staff of an agency, or the closeness of the working relationship, or
the lack of experienced counsel in the agency to carry on separately
the functions of advocate and advisor, the Justice Department
should be free to continue its practice of assigning an attorney from
its own staff to carry on one of these functions. Such an action
should not be regarded as "perilously close" to a due process viola-
tion. 5
There are certainly possibilities for prejudice where counsel car-
ries on too many functions. The difficulty in commingling functions
expressed in Dussia is that if the same person prosecutes and adju-
dicates, there is an intolerable suspicion that the ultimate decision
will be based on the determination to prosecute. Nevertheless, in
Withrow, the Supreme Court of the United States observed that in
most cases" psychological suspicion is not significant enough to
upset the administrative process.
91. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 192, 292 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
92. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 67 & 68 supra.
94. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 295, 361 A.2d 497 (1976). See text accompanying notes 62 & 63
supra.
95. See State Bd. of Medical Educ. & Licensure v. Grumbles, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 74, 79,
347 A.2d 782, 785 (1975).
96. The court-martial situation in Dussia might be regarded as one of the exceptions
contemplated by the Court where a fair hearing is "foreclosed." 421 U.S. at 58.
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When dealing with the role of counsel, however, there are slightly
different concerns. Once counsel participates in the decision to
"prosecute" or actually does "prosecute," the expectation is that
counsel would like to "win" the case. There is also the risk that
counsel will attempt to influence the ultimate decision to coincide
with the original advice he or she gave. 7 Accordingly, counsel who
prosecutes should ordinarily not render legal advice to the agency
on its decision in the case. But, even here, counsel's role as legal
advisor requires that if he or she concludes after prosecution that
the facts are not sufficient to sustain a violation, or that the law
must be construed in a manner different than originally supposed,
then counsel should advise either the agency or the attorney-advisor
to the agency in the particular matter.
On the other hand, where counsel has merely given general legal
advice on the issue, it would not be inappropriate for him or her to
prosecute. Just as a litigant before. a court cannot claim a denial
of due process because the court has previously resolved the legal
issue in the case contrary to the litigant, there is no denial of due
process where an agency follows the previous legal advice of its
counsel. Indeed, it may even be argued that it is not a denial of due
process for counsel to give formal legal advice in the very case at
issue because that advice is subject, in any event, to judicial review.
Thus, it may not matter whether the advice was given before or after
the case arises; the risk of prejudice is reduced since counsel will
have to defend any such advice in argument before the court on
appeal.
C. Suggested Harmonization
By considering four of the typical situations which occur in ad-
ministrative proceedings, and articulating what appear to be proper
and improper actions, perhaps the best summary of this discussion
can be developed.
Situation one: an agency and its counsel receive information which
gives rise to a determination to conduct a formal hearing.
Although this only tangentially involves the role of counsel, it
97. See Donnon v. Downingtown Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 283 A.2d
92 (1971).
98. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Feeser, 364 A.2d 1324 (Pa. 1976).
1977
Duquesne Law Review
does involve a problem which administrative agencies face daily of
needing some basis upon which to make a preliminary determina-
tion to act. Withrow v. Larkin is wholly applicable to this situa-
tion.9 The involvement of prosecuting or adjudicatory counsel in
receiving information does not constitute unfair treatment of the
respondent. Whatever facts are to be the basis of the adjudication
must be found in the record. The agency will have to make its
determination based on such facts and the respondent will have his
rights to cross-examine and to introduce testimony.10
Situation two: counsel advises the agency and prosecutes before the
agency.
This basically is the issue confronted by the supreme court in
Feeser. For an agency to function properly, it is necessary to have
an attorney who can give it general legal advice applicable in appro-
priate cases. It is not inherently wrong for an attorney to advise an
agency that certain actions constitute a violation of state law, then
to prosecute a specific case before the agency. In fact, it would be
ridiculous to lose the benefit of having the most knowledgeable at-
torney handle the case because he or she gave the agency initial
legal advice on the question. Any suspicions that the attorney's
desire to win will give rise to unfairness are obviated by the fact that
his or her legal opinion, if erroneous, will be reversed on appeal.
Untrammeled zeal is thus balanced by a strong desire to avoid the
embarrassment of having rendered a wrong legal opinion.
Situation three: counsel advises the agency during the proceedings.
The problems raised here are more subtle. Substantively, it might
be argued that the rendering of legal advice by the prosecuting
attorney should be no different than the giving of advice before the
hearing has begun. Why should it matter that a particular issue has
been raised before or after the hearing commences? However, if the
99. The commonwealth court seems to have independently allowed this in Wasniewski v,
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 166, 299 A.2d 676 (1973); see State Dental Council
& Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910 (1974).
100. See, e.g., Schuman's Village Square Drugs, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Phar-
macy, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 456, 320 A.2d 377 (1974).
101. Commonwealth v. Chairman, 377 A.2d 1022 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
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agency is bound to follow the advice of the attorney with respect to
legal matters, there is an appearance that it will also follow the
attorney's advice with respect to factual matters. Indeed, the
agency itself may not perceive the distinction. 0' Accordingly, con-
ferring legal advice and influencing findings of fact must be differ-
entiated. 02 If the prosecuting attorney could advise the agency on
factual determinations, it is likely that he or she would wish to have
the facts found in favor of the prosecution. 3 Since factual issues are
generally reviewable only under the substantial evidence rule,"0 ' the
agency's findings would in most cases be upheld by the reviewing
court. Thus, there is a tangible distinction between an attorney's
advice on facts and an attorney's advice on law; factual advice is
not as strictly reviewable as legal opinions. The giving of any advice
by the attorney prosecuting the case is therefore properly precluded
under the unfairness doctrine enunciated in Horn.0 5
Situation four: preparation of an adjudication by prosecuting
counsel.
The mere embodiment of the determination of the agency into a
legal adjudication has been held to be a proper function of the
prosecuting attorney. 06 In this regard, counsel who is familiar with
the case is simply performing a ministerial function for the agency
he or she serves. The efficiency of having an attorney familiar with
the case prepare the adjudication would seem to outweigh any pre-
dilection by the attorney to prepare an unduly harsh adjudication.
Moreover, the adjudication must be reviewed and approved by the
agency itself to see whether it accurately expresses its findings. And,
perhaps more importantly, from the attorney's viewpoint, the adju-
102. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 295, 302-03, 361 A.2d 497, 501-02 (1976).
103. See Donnon v. Downingtown Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 283 A.2d
92 (1971).
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.44 (Purdon 1962). See, e.g., A.P. Weaver & Sons
v. Sanitary Water Bd., 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 499, 284 A.2d 515 (1971).
105. But see H.A. Steen Indus., Inc. v. Cavanaugh, 430 Pa. 10, 241 A.2d 771 (1968), where
the City Solicitor of Philadelphia gave legal advice on an issue after it had been argued before
and decided by a city agency in a manner contrary to the City Solicitor's view of the law.
Although no due process issue was raised in the case, the propriety of such action was
sustained by the court without question and the propriety of the advice reviewed on the
merits.
106. See note 48 supra.
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dication will have to be defended on appeal. Nevertheless, the
agency should normally obtain independent review of the adjudica-
tion by another attorney.' 7
IV. CONCLUSION
If the courts recognize the legal duties of government counsel and
allow for the flexibility encouraged by Withrow, they will be able
to enunciate appropriate standards for counsel to govern them-
selves. The key issue is whether participation of counsel prejudices
the facts found or penalty imposed, as compared to legal conclu-
sions, which are fully reviewable. The participation in legal issues,
the every day task of a government lawyer, does not create the kind
of inherent bias which renders unfair any hearing he or she partici-
pates in.
This is not to say that procedures utilized in Pennsylvania are
optimal, or that merely because a due process violation charge is
rejected by a slim majority, as in Feeser, the state agencies should
sit back and assume no changes are necessary. The problem of
commingling of functions arises generally because of the need to
advise the agency of the law, to decide whether sufficient evidence
has been introduced to sustain certain factual findings, and to
make evidentiary rulings during the process of a hearing. If the
hearing and factual function were assumed by an independent pro-
fessional hearing examiner, much of the problem would be elimi-
nated. It is for this reason that there has been prepared legislation
to erect a hearing examiner office in the Commonwealth. °8 If due
process does not mandate it, due regard for fairness does. Until such
an office is instituted, it is hoped that this article may assist in
explaining the requirements of due process imposed by the Pennsyl-
vania and United States Constitutions. 0 9
107. Section 36 of the Administrative Agency Law requires the Department of Justice to
pass upon any proposed action. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.36 (Purdon 1962). This function
is normally carried out by approving a proposed adjudication, which is far more significant
than a proposed citation.
108. See Cokin & Mallamud, Hearing Officers in Pennsylvania: Recommendation for an
Independent Central Office, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 605 (1977).
109. Compare 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.11 (1958), with K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.13 (Supp. 1970). It is submitted that Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35 (1975) is the noteworthy case Professor Davis was awaiting.
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